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Sklar and Rushing agreed to the creation of an overriding royalty measured by total unit production. Sklar then sold to Moffatt an override, and under the terms of the agreement Moffatt
agreed to bear any other outstanding overrides. One wonders
whether, by an agreement with Moffatt, Sklar can push around
the burden of the Rushing override at will. If the intent of the
letter agreement between Sklar and Rushing was that Rushing
would have an override out of the leases assigned amounting to
one thirty-second of seven-eighths of total unit production, that
overriding royalty would seem to be a burden on the entirety of
the working interest of the assigned leases. Although Moffatt
could certainly agree to assume the burden of Rushing's overriding royalty interest, it seems questionable whether by contracting with someone else Sklar can effectively limit Rushing's right
to secure his agreed share of production to the interest created
by him in favor of Moffatt. Thus, it seems to the writer that
although Moffatt definitely is not bound, Sklar might be considered as continuing to be bound to fulfill the terms of the
letter agreement as incorporated by reference in the assignment.
CORPORATIONS
Milton M. Harrison*
The Louisiana courts only infrequently have disregarded
corporateness, pierced the corporate veil, or treated the corporation as the alter ego of even a sole shareholder in order to assess
personal liability on the shareholder for corporate obligations.
In Pasternack v. Louisiana & Ariz. Lands, Inc.,1 however, the
court disregarded the corporateness. The corporation had as its
only asset certain immovable property. It was agreed by the
corporation, through its sole shareholder as president, that plaintiff would be paid a broker's commission of $25,000 if optionees
exercised their option to purchase the property belonging to the
corporation. In lieu of exercising its option, the optionees purchased from the sole shareholder all shares in the corporation
and dissolved the corporation with the property distributed to
themselves. As part payment for the shares in the corporation
the former sole shareholder was given a mortgage on the property, thus becoming a preferred creditor. The corporation after
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 254 So.2d 142 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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dissolution had no assets with which to pay the commission, and
the property was subject to mortgage in excess of its value. The
court held that insofar as the ordinary creditors are concerned,
the transaction amounted to an unlawful dividend or distribution of the assets of the corporation and the former sole shareholder was held individually liable for the broker's commission
under the provision of section 93 of the Business Corporation
Law.2 The court stated further that the corporation was but
the alter ego of the sole shareholder who could not hide behind
thi corporate veil and be immune from his fraudulent practices.
The facts of this case justify the disregard of corporateness.
In two cases8 the courts had occasion to determine whether
a corporate officer had sufficiently identified his corporate principle to a creditor that the officer as agent would be relieved
from personal liability. Both cases involved suits on open account and each court applied the rule that the agent must carry
the burden of proving that he identified his corporate principal
and that he made it abundantly clear that he was acting for his
principal and not as an individual. 4
Hebert v. Stansbury" presents two interesting interpretations of the new corporation law. Section 73 of the law provides
that notice of a shareholders' meeting shall be given "at least
ten days . ..prior to the day fixed for the meeting."6 The court

held that the day of mailing is included in the computation of
the ten days but that the day of the meeting is not.
There was also a contest concerning the right to cumulate
fractional shares as a basis for voting. Section 51D provides
that "the holder of a fractional share certificate shall .. .have

all rights of a shareholder except voting rights." Fifty shares in
the corporation, one-half of the outstanding shares, were owned
by the plaintiff and her two children, she owning 8 shares and
each of her children owned 20% shares. The books of the corporation listed the plaintiff as owner for her 8 shares, and
plaintiff as usufructuary for the 41/ shares belonging to her
children. If she could cumulate all fractional shares, she would
2. LA. R.S. 12:93 (Supp. 1968).
3. Williams v. O'Bryan, 257 So.2d 174 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Prevost v.
Gomez, 251 So.2d 470 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
4. See LA. CIv. CovM arts. 3012-13.
5. 248 So.2d 873 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
6. IA. R.S. 12:73D (Supp. 1968).
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be entitled to 50 votes; if she could treat all shares held as usufructuary as one unit she could vote 49 shares (8 + 41); however,
if each owner's shares are considered to be separate she could
vote only 48 shares (8 + 20 + 20). The court held that the books
of the corporation control. Therefore since the children's shares
are listed on the books as 41% in the name of the usufructuary,
she could vote the 41 shares.
In Leaman Corp. v. Morrisonj the court interpreted section
172 of the corporation law.8 Section 102 requires the filing of
an annual report with the Secretary of State, and section 172B
provides that an officer of a corporation who refuses to deliver
to a shareholder, on written request, a copy of the annual report
"shall be under a penalty of fifty dollars" for every day the officer refuses or neglects to deliver the report. In this case the
corporation was without funds. Evidence was introduced that
the preparation of the report would require an audit costing
$5,000. The court refused to impose the penalty provided in the
statute, saying that "certainly it is within the contemplation of
the law that such report be available or reasonably obtainable,
or its nonavailability be attributable to some cause of neglect,
refusal or bad faith on the part of the officer on whom the demand was made for the report." Although the decision departs
from the mandatory language of the statute, the decision does
not do violence to the devices designed for the protection of
shareholders.
Two shareholders, owning all the shares of a corporation,
agreed that upon the death of one shareholder, the corporation
would purchase the deceased's shares. 10 To provide funds for
the purchase, the corporation secured life insurance policies on
the lives of each of the shareholders, the corporation being the
beneficiary. The corporation was in receivership. The court
applied section 55A of the corporation law which provides that
a "corporation shall not purchase or redeem its shares when it
is insolvent, or when such purchase or redemption would render
it insolvent . . . ." Therefore, pending a determination of solvency, the proceeds of the insurance policies are merely assets of
the corporation and cannot be used to purchase the shares of the
7. 258 So.2d 691 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
8. LA. R.S. 12 (Supp. 1968).
9. 258 So.2d at 694.
10. Collins v. Universal Parts Co., 260 So.2d 702 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL 33

deceased shareholder. It should make no difference under section 55A whether the repurchase is a voluntary one or whether
it is pursuant to a contract as in the present case; the corporation may not prejudice corporate creditors by diverting funds
to redeem stock.
TRUSTS
Gerald Le Van*
The only decision of note dealing with private express trusts
was rendered by the Third Circuit in Harriss v. ConcordiaBank
& Trust Co.,' where the beneficiary sought to terminate the trust
or alternatively to require invasion to the extent of $40,000 to
pay outstanding bills. Mrs. Harriss' husband had created a testamentary trust over his entire estate, she being the beneficiary as
to one-fourth of both principal and interest. The other beneficiaries were her children. As to her interest, the trust was to
continue for life, whereas the trust terminated as to the children's interests when the youngest attained age 25.
Apparently, the principal trust property was a portfolio of
securities worth several hundred thousand dollars at the settlor's
death. The trust instrument permitted invasion of principal for
Mrs. Harriss' benefit in the trustees' "uncontrolled discretion...
in case of serious illness, surgical operation, or other grave emergency." During the twelve-year period between her husband's
death and the institution of this suit, Mrs. Harriss suffered an
incredible series of personal, physical, mental, family, and financial disasters. On five different occasions, the trustee had invaded
principal on behalf of Mrs. Harriss in an aggregate amount of
some $165,000. Apparently, she had joined the trustee on each
occasion in obtaining a court order authorizing the invasion.
However, in this instance, it appears that the trustee neither
joined nor opposed her attempt to terminate the trust or alternatively to invade principal once again. At the time of trial, her
monthly trust income was approximately $800.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University and Assistant
Reporter for Louisiana Law Institute Committee for Continuing Revision of
the Louisiana Trust Code.
1. 265 So.2d 330 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972). The reader may also be interested in Bertrand v. Sandoz, 260 La. 239, 255 So.2d 754 (1971), which upholds
the constitutionality of the so-called "public trust" for the financing of public improvements.

